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Abstract 
Our aim in this article is to analyse the provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 that deal with 
pre-strike ballots and picketing. We also consider Government proposals to legislate in 
respect of protests associated with industrial action (‘leverage action’), which were 
abandoned in favour of plans to amend the Code of Practice on Picketing. We note the 
suggestion made by several commentators and Opposition politicians that the Government 
might have intended with these changes to make it significantly more difficult for trade 
unions and workers to exercise their right to take industrial action and to engage in forms of 
protest associated with industrial action. Examining the stated policy aims of Government, 
and available evidence which speaks to those policy aims and to the likely impact of the new 
rules, we argue that the freedom of workers and trade unions to participate in and organise 
industrial action has indeed been narrowed very considerably by this Act; further, that the 
case for amending the existing legal framework was not at all well made. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The focus of this article lies with the provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 that deal with 
pre-strike ballots and picketing. In consulting upon these provisions, and as the Bill made its 
way through Parliament, the Government explained its policy objectives with reference to its 
concern about a lack of ‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’, and about the intimidation of non-striking 
workers.1 It was ‘undemocratic’, the Government suggested, that under the current 
legislation, industrial action could take place on the basis of ‘low ballot turnouts’, with the 
support of only ‘a small proportion of union members’.2 It was ‘unfair’ that members of the 
public should be inconvenienced by a disruption of public services caused by industrial 
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1 See eg Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Trade Union Bill: Consultation on Ballot Thresholds 
in Important Public Services (July 2015) [BIS/15/418] 
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action. Though an existing Code of Practice sought to ensure that picketing was lawful and 
peaceful, there had been a number of high-profile allegations, in recent years, of the rules 
being flouted, or proving difficult to enforce.3 Under the terms of the new Act, changes to the 
law were made accordingly: raising the turnout and voting thresholds that trade unions must 
meet when balloting members, increasing information burdens, extending notice periods, and 
placing a number of significant restrictions on the right to picket. Estimating the likely effect 
of these amendments on the freedom of action of trade unions to be severe, some 
commentators raised the question whether the Government might have intended therewith to 
‘ban strikes by the back door’.4 
 
Our aim in what follows is to analyse the relevant provisions and their underlying policy 
objectives, stated or unstated. In doing so, we take it as given that the rights to strike and to 
picket are human rights, guaranteed inter alia under Article 6 of the European Social Charter, 
Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and ILO Convention 87.5 
Recognition of this informs our critique of the 2016 Act, providing a normative dimension to 
the analysis. Our concern is not, however, to give detailed consideration of the ways in which 
the terms of the Act may breach human rights and international law.6 Instead, we wish, first, 
to understand the new rules with reference to earlier instantiations of the relevant legal 
framework, and to current policy debates, and, second, to assess the likely impact of the new 
rules on workers’ freedom to participate in industrial action. To what extent, and in which 
circumstances, are the rules likely to prevent trade unions from winning the necessary support 
of the membership in pre-strike ballots? To what extent will they hinder trade unions in the 
organisation of pickets and other forms of protest? Do they appear to create new 
opportunities for employers to seek injunctions, prohibiting industrial action even in cases 
where a union has won, or was set to win, the support of the necessary majority of members? 
 
We begin the article by outlining the legal framework that regulates the right to strike and to 
picket in the UK, paying particular attention to the ability of employers to halt industrial 
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action by means of interim injunctions.7 In parts 3 and 4, we focus on the balloting and 
notice, and the picketing and protest provisions respectively. Part 5 concludes by addressing 
the question, whether the Act can rightfully be regarded as banning industrial action by the 
back door. We argue here that one, at least, of the Government’s main aims in introducing 
this legislation appears to have been to make it harder for trade unions to organise industrial 
action, and thereby to weaken their ability to protest or resist measures taken by employers, 
especially in the public sector. Available evidence suggests that the Act will have precisely 
that effect; moreover, alternative justifications of the new rules offered by Government fail to 
convince. 
 
 
2.  Immunities and Injunctions 
Under UK law, the statutory provisions which permit the organisation of industrial action are 
framed in terms of immunities from liability in tort for any losses caused by reason of the 
action to the employer or third parties.8 Where the so-called ‘statutory immunities’ apply, 
individual workers participating in the industrial action are also protected to a limited extent 
against dismissal.9 In order to benefit from the immunities, a trade union must comply with 
two sets of requirements, substantive and procedural. Stated very broadly, the general rule is 
that a trade union will not be liable in tort for industrial action taken in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute, provided that certain procedural steps have been taken. The 
procedural requirements involve two sets of obligations. First, a trade union which is 
planning industrial action must hold a ballot of the relevant workers, and the planned action 
must be supported by a stipulated proportion of those workers. Second, the union must 
provide the employer(s) of the relevant workers, and the workers themselves, with specified 
information and notice relating to the ballot and to the pursuant industrial action.  
 
The provisions regulating the trade unions’ obligation to ballot the membership and to 
provide notice and information are contained in Part V of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 [hereinafter ‘TULRCA'].  A Code of Practice on 
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Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to Employers accompanies the legislation.10 In 1999 and 
2004, efforts were made to simplify and clarify particular aspects of the law.11 
Notwithstanding these efforts, the balloting and notice provisions remain remarkably 
complicated, so that the exact nature of the steps which trade unions must take is not always 
clear.12 Members of the judiciary routinely disagree as to extent of the unions’ obligations, 
even in the upper courts.13  
 
Picketing is addressed directly in the TULRCA by a provision which renders it ‘lawful’ for a 
person (i) in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (ii) to attend at or near his own 
place of work for the purpose of ‘peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or 
peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working’.14 A Code of Practice on 
Picketing limits the number of pickets who may attend at any single entrance to 6 – in the 
eyes of the Courts, a larger number may constitute evidence that the workers had a purpose 
other than peaceful communication or persuasion, bringing their actions outside of the 
definition of such picketing as is deemed ‘lawful’.15 Only picketing which falls within the 
terms of that same definition may benefit from the statutory immunities from liability in tort 
referred to above.16  
 
Where workers engage in forms of protest in connection with an industrial dispute, which do 
not fall within the statutory definition of lawful picketing (for example because they are not 
at or near their own place of work), their actions may be found to constitute a wide variety of 
civil and criminal wrongs.17 If they breach their contracts of employment, the tort of inducing 
breach of contract may apply to those who have organised the action. Private nuisance will 
apply where there is undue interference with a person’s enjoyment of his or her property, and 
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13 See eg the Court of Appeal decision in Metrobus Ltd v.Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829, in which 
there was disagreement among the three Lord Justices regarding the correct interpretation of section 226A(2)(c) 
TULRCA 
14 TULRCA s. 220 
15 Code of Practice on Picketing. Thomas v. NUM (South Wales Area) [1985] ICR 887. See, however, the more 
recent decisions of Gate Gourmet v TGWU [2005] IRLR 881, Kuznetsov v Russia [2008] ECHR 1170, which 
cast doubt on the continued authoritativeness of Thomas.  
16 TULRCA s. 219(3) 
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other torts, such as assault, may apply to serious intimidation.18 As far as criminal liability is 
concerned, there is what Ford and Novitz describe as a ‘bewildering array of criminal 
offences regulating public protest in the UK’, so that a wide range of behaviour is caught, and 
offences often overlap.19 In addition, police have powers to give directions to protestors and 
others, and to arrest those who fail to comply.20  
 
 
Injunctions 
As aptly noted by Ewing, the ‘first aim of the employer in a dispute may be to prevent 
industrial action from taking place, and for this purpose an injunction may be sought’.21  It is 
well accepted that injunctions ‘in practice, … tend to be determinative of the dispute’, 22 and 
‘that the requirements for obtaining an interim injunction are not onerous’.23 Evidence shows 
that where interim injunctions are sought, they are granted much more often than not.24 
Where an interim injunction has been granted, the trade union will not usually re-ballot.25  
 
The ability of employers to succeed in their intent of stemming industrial action at its outset 
is typically the function of three distinct, but inevitably interlinked, factors. Firstly, it will 
depend on the ability of employers, and their counsel, to argue successfully that, should the 
contemplated industrial action go ahead, they would be the victims of a legal wrong. It is here 
that the statutory immunities assume practical importance, together with the legislative 
circumscription of the substantive and procedural requirements with which a union must 
comply in order to benefit from them. The greater in number and the more stringent these 
requirements, and the narrower the concept of ‘protected’ action, the higher the likelihood 
that the employers will be able to argue that one or more breaches will  occur, resulting in the 
                                                 
18 M Ford and T Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness… Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the Trade 
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19 Ford and Novitz, 546 citing eg the Public Order Act 1986, especially ss 4A and 5; s 137 of the Highways 
Act; s 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and s 241 of TULRCA 
20 Ford and Novitz, 546 citing eg Public Order Act 1986, s 12; the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s 42; 
and Part 3 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
21 H Collins, KD Ewing, A McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge 2012), 713. 
22 ACL Davies, Employment Law (Pearson, 2015), 490.  
23 Ibid. 
24 G Gall, ‘Research Note: Injunctions as a Legal Weapon in Industrial Disputes in Britain 1995-2005’ (2006) 
44(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations 327-49, 332 
25 Gall 2006, 338-9 
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action not being protected, and thus giving rise to a legal wrong and, possibly, an 
injunction.26  
 
Secondly, although this point is controversial, it will often depend on the ability of employers 
to convince the courts that, unless interim relief is granted pending the full trial, the wrong 
they are deemed to suffer will result in a loss that they would struggle to recover in a 
satisfactory way at trial. In effect, this ‘involves a consideration of the losses which would be 
incurred on either side’,27 and a reintroduction of the ‘balance of convenience’ element of the 
American Cyanamid test by means of judicial intervention,28 after Parliament had replaced it 
with the more attuned test currently contained in TULRCA, s. 221(2).29 On paper, this 
statutory test exclusively requires that where a union against whom an injunction is sought 
claims to act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, ‘the court shall, in exercising 
its discretion whether or not to grant the injunction, have regard to the likelihood of that 
party’s succeeding at the trial of the action in establishing any matter which would afford a 
defence to the action under section 219 (protection from certain tort liabilities) or section 220 
(peaceful picketing)’, without any reference to a consideration of the economic losses the 
parties may suffer. In this sense, the judicial reintroduction of a ‘balance of convenience’ test 
is particularly problematic: ‘[o]nce the debate is deflected away from law onto extraneous 
matters of this kind, the union’s arguments are never likely to prevail’.30 Typically, 
businesses, especially larger ones, are far more likely to be able to demonstrate substantial 
losses as a direct consequence of the withdrawal of their workers’ labour. Even ‘where there 
are strong arguments either way the balance of convenience may still lead to an injunction 
being granted’.31 
 
In recent years, key judgments such as those in RMT v Serco32 and Balfour Beatty33 have 
robustly reasserted that ‘it is unjust to trade unions to determine the question’34 by reference 
                                                 
26 Section 232B TULR(C)A 1992 seeks to protect industrial action from the consequences of ‘small accidental 
failures’ made at specified stages of the balloting process.  
27 British Telecommunications Plc v Communication Workers Union [2004] IRLR 58 (QB), 62. 
28 For a historical analysis of the emergence and decline of this test in the industrial action context, see Collins, 
Ewing, McColgan, 713-717. For a critical account of the case-law in the period between 2000 and 2009 see N 
Countouris and M Freedland, ‘Injunctions, Cyanamid, and the Corrosion of the Right to Strike in the UK’ 
(2010) European Labour Law Journal, 489. 
29 Originally section 17 of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations 1974 Act as amended by the Employment 
Protection Act 1975. 
30 Collins, Ewing, McColgan, 719. 
31 S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law (6th ed, 2012), 1094. 
32 [2011] EWCA Civ 226 
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to American Cyanamid and the ‘balance of convenience’ test, which ‘almost always lies in 
favour of granting the injunction pending trial’.35 A correct application of s. 221 ‘involves 
considering whether the union would be likely to be able to establish at trial that the 
immunities are applicable’ or not.36 But in spite of these important clarifications, the ‘balance 
of convenience’ test has retained an important, and arguably undeserved, presence in at least 
three important scenarios.37 Under one interpretation of s. 221(2) TULR(C)A 1992, its more 
lenient provisions only apply when the action falls within the definition of action protected 
under s. 219 and peaceful picketing under s. 220 TULR(C)A. When this is not the case, for 
instance ‘because there has been no ballot …, nor is the matter in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute as referred to in those sections [the courts] have to ask the 
questions which arise under traditional American Cyanamid principles’.38 These principles 
will also be deployed when the strike is anticipated to fall outside the immunities because 
some of the stringent procedural requirements have been performed in an imperfect way, and 
appears to be vitiated by failures.39 Secondly, it is clear that courts will fall back on American 
Cyanamid whenever ‘the applicant suggests heads of liability which are not within the scope 
of the immunities, such as a breach of statutory duty’.40 Finally, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that courts may adopt an American Cyanamid based ‘balance of convenience’ test 
where they judge that action which may, more likely than not, be designated at trial as 
protected action taken in relation to a valid trade dispute, would nevertheless cause a severe 
disruption causing very serious harm to the public interest. The point was expressed very 
clearly by Lord Diplock in NWL v Woods,41 and more recently by Kerr J in a request by the 
Secretary of State for Education for an ‘interim declaration’ against strike action called by 
NUT against Sixth Form Colleges.42 Even though this judgment noted that s. 221(2) 
TULRCA was the appropriate test under which the declaration ought to be considered, and 
even though the judge was satisfied that ‘the “more likely than not” result at any trial of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Ltd v Unite the Union [2012] EWHC 267 (QB) 
34 RMT v Serco [2011] EWCA Civ 226, para?? 11, per Elias LJ. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. p. 12. 
37Deakin and Morris, 1093-1094. 
38 Govia Thameslink Railway Limited v The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen [2016] 
EWHC 985 (QB), paras 5-6, per Langstaff J. 
39 Cf. the case law discussed in Countouris and Freedland , 493-498, and the more recent Network Rail 
Infrastructure Limited v The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Worker [2010] EWHC 1084 
(QB), although note that the judgment in RMT v Serco should have contributed significantly in restoring the 
importance of s.232B TULRCA [2011] EWCA Civ 226, paras 47-57. 
40 Deakin and Morris, 1093. See the decision in Associated British Ports v Transport and General Workers' 
Union Mersey Docks and Harbour Co. v Same Port of London Authority v Same [1989] 3 All E.R. 822. 
41 [1979] ICR 867 (HL), pp. 881–2 (Lord Diplock). 
42 SS for Education v NUT [2016] EWHC 812 (QB). 
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issue would be that the NUT’s strategy is to protect its members’ jobs and conditions’,43 the 
decision still assessed the ‘severe disruption to the education of students, to their parents, to 
the governing bodies of the sixth form colleges and to the work of the non-teaching staff 
employed’.44 While Kerr J ultimately refused to issue a declaration, conceding that if 
‘wrongly granted now [it] would probably in practice defeat the exercise of such rights as the 
NUT has to call a strike without infringing the law’,45 the fact remains that courts will assess 
the impact of industrial action on the public interest, and presumably draw consequences 
from it in a way that puts a problematic gloss on the letter of s.221(2), even where action is 
called well within the narrow parameters of legality provided by Parliament.  
 
This last point about the growing importance of ‘public interest’ considerations in the award 
of injunctions against strikes is arguably emerging as the third main factor shaping the ability 
of employers to stop industrial action in its tracks. It is clear, as noted above, that ‘public 
interest’ will be an important factor to consider even where the anticipated industrial action is 
deemed to be otherwise lawful. Various obiter dicta suggest that judges would apply a 
relatively high threshold, and look for consequences that would be particularly ‘disastrous’,46 
causing ‘immediate serious danger to public safety or health’,47  or ‘endangers the nation or 
puts at risk such fundamental rights as the right of the public to be informed and the freedom 
of the press.’48 But cases such as that involving the BA cabin crew dispute of 2009 suggest 
that – especially where there are doubts regarding the ability of the union to vindicate the 
lawfulness of its actions at trial – nothing as draconian is necessary. A court can grant an 
injunction on the basis that the action, among other things, is believed to be ‘fundamentally 
more damaging’ because it is ‘taking place  … over twelve days of the Christmas period’,49 
and even because of ‘the very serious inconvenience that the proposed action is likely to 
cause the travelling public’.50 Judicial reference to the public interest in this context is 
therefore proceeding down a highly problematic slippery slope, especially when we consider 
that UK law, until the adoption by Parliament of the Trade Union Act 2016, had not expressly 
                                                 
43 Para 69. 
44 Para 80. 
45 Para 84. 
46 NWL v Woods [1979] ICR 867 (HL), 881–2 (Lord Diplock). 
47 Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] ICR 161, 187 (Lord Fraser). 
48 Express Newspapers Ltd v. McShane [1980] ICR 42 (HL), 65. 
49 British Airways Plc v Unite the Union [2009] EWHC 3541 (QB), para 83. 
50 Metroline Travel Ltd, Arriva the Shires Ltd, London General Transport Ltd v Unite the Union [2012] EWHC 
1778 (QB), para 67. 
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sought to draw a distinction between general, and essential or ‘important’, services in the 
context of industrial action. 
 
 
3.  Pre-Strike Ballots 
In respect of the requirement to ballot members in advance of taking industrial action, the 
effect of the amendments contained within the 2016 Act is to increase the threshold turnout 
and percentage of the vote that a trade union must secure if it is to benefit from the statutory 
immunities. Prior to the Act coming into force, planned industrial action had only to win the 
support of a simple majority of the relevant workers, regardless of the size of the turnout. 
Under the new rules, in all ballots for industrial action, at least 50% of the union members 
entitled to vote must take part in the ballot in order for it to be valid.51 For example, in a 
ballot affecting 200 union members, at least 100 of those members would have to vote in 
order for it to be valid, and a simple majority of those voting would have to vote in favour of 
taking industrial action. Furthermore, when industrial action is planned in ‘important public 
services’, trade unions must meet the additional requirement that 40% of all those entitled to 
vote should vote yes.52 So, in a ballot affecting 200 union members, at least 100 of those 
members would have to vote, and at least 80 would have to vote in support of the industrial 
action.   
 
According to the terms of section 3 of the Act, the higher threshold defined therein will apply 
wherever the majority of those entitled to vote in the ballot are ‘normally engaged’ in the 
provision of important public services. (An additional reference in the Bill to those normally 
engaged in the provision of services ‘ancillary’ to important public services was removed by 
Government after consultation highlighted the difficulties that would be involved in its 
application.53) Section 3 goes on to provide that ‘important public services’ are to be defined 
in due course by the Secretary of State, ‘who may specify only services that fall within any of 
the following’: health services; education of those aged under 17; fire services; transport 
services; decommissioning of nuclear installations and management of radioactive waste and 
spent fuel; border security. As is confirmed by the terms of draft regulations issued in January 
2016, the application of the section thus extends far beyond essential services, which are 
                                                 
51 TU Act, s. 2 amending s. 226 TULRCA 
52 TU Act, s. 3 amending s. 226 TULRCA 
53 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Government Response to Consultation on Thresholds (January 
2016) [BIS/16/15], paras 64-67, 77 
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defined rather narrowly in international law as services the interruption of which would 
‘endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’.54 There 
has been significant slippage, here, since the publication of the Conservative Party’s 
Manifesto in April 2015 and the Queen’s Speech the following month, both of which referred 
to the introduction of new higher thresholds in ‘essential’ public services.   
 
Since 1993, the TULRCA has stipulated that pre-strike ballots must be conducted by way of a 
postal vote, administered in accordance with detailed rules under the supervision of an 
independent scrutineer.55 The Trade Union Act does not yet relax these rules, but paves the 
way for change, providing in section 4 for an independent review on the delivery of secure 
methods of electronic balloting, and for the use of pilot schemes. The section stipulates that 
the review shall be commissioned within 6 months of the passing of the Act. It directs the 
Secretary of State to consider the report, and in preparing his or her response (to be published 
and laid before each House of Parliament) to ‘consult relevant organisations including 
professionals from expert associations to seek their advice and recommendations’.56 It does 
not commit the Government to introduce e-balloting; however, in the House of Commons, 
Business Minister Nick Boles gave a ‘verbal guarantee’ that e-balloting would be rolled-out 
provided that the review found it to be safe.57 
 
Sections 5 to 9 of the 2016 Act significantly augment the obligations placed on trade unions 
to provide notice and information in connection with the ballot and ensuing industrial action. 
Of particular note is the rule contained in section 5, that in addition to the existing 
requirement that unions ask members, on the ballot paper, whether they wish to participate in 
a strike or action short of a strike, they must now also include ‘a summary of the matter or 
matters in issue in the trade dispute’; specify, in the case of action short of a strike, the type 
or types of industrial action to be taken; and indicate the time period during which it is 
expected that the action will take place.58 Further provisions extend the period of notice that 
must be given to the employer of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days, 
and replace the current requirement that there must be some industrial action within a period 
                                                 
54 ILO Digest on Freedom of Association, 5th revised edition (ILO 2006), para. 583. [Draft] Industrial Action 
(Important Public Services) Regulations 2016: BIS/16/15, Annex B 
55 Except in cases where only 50 or fewer members are entitled to vote: TULRCA ss226-234 as amended by 
TURERA 1993. The Trade Union Act 1984, Part II had provided for postal ballots or workplace ballots. 
56 TU Act, s. 4(5) 
57 Hansard 27 April, 2016 
58 TU Act, s. 5 amending s. 229 TULRCA 
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of 4 to 8 weeks in order for the mandate to remain valid with a provision that the members’ 
agreement to a union’s proposed industrial action will automatically expire after six 
months.59 When informing the relevant workers of the result of the ballot, as it is already 
required to do, a union must now include a statement of whether at least 50% of those entitled 
to vote did so, and, in the case of important public services, whether at least 40% of those 
entitled to vote voted yes.60 Where a union fails to meet any of these new obligations, the 
statutory immunities will not apply.61 Failure to meet an additional new requirement – to 
inform the Certification Officer annually of any industrial action taken in the previous 12 
months – could result in the imposition by the Certification Officer of a financial penalty of 
between £200 and £20,000.62 
 
 
Explaining the changes 
In seeking to explain the policy objectives underlying the changes to the balloting thresholds, 
the Government referred, as we have seen, to the need to ensure ‘fairness’ and ‘democracy’ 
in the organisation of industrial action.63 The picture presented – by members of the 
Conservative Party, Government Ministers, and representatives of the CBI alike – was one of 
aggressive, even violent, union leaders, who, in pursuit of radically left-wing objectives, 
intimidated or ‘bullied’ members into taking part in industrial action despite their better 
judgment.64 Some sympathy was extended to the ‘bullied’ union members and, much more 
so, to the disappointed would-be consumers of the public services affected by the industrial 
action. The conclusion drawn was that tougher legislative controls of industrial action were 
desirable – in order to subject union leaders to the ‘democratic’ control of members, and to 
limit the occasions on which consumers might be inconvenienced by industrial action. The 
main features of this narrative were thus neatly encapsulated in the headline attached to a 
Daily Telegraph article written by Boris Johnson in 2010: ‘There should be a law against 
                                                 
59 TU Act ss. 8 and 9 amending ss.234A and 234 TULRCA respectively. In the unlikely event of trade union 
and employer agreement to do so, the 6 month period may be extended to 9 months: TU Act s. 9 
60 TU Act, s. 6 amending s. 231 TULRCA 
61 TULRCA s. 226 as amended. The question of a union’s compliance or non-compliance with these provisions 
should be judged subject to the de minimis principle: RMT v Serco [2011] EWCA Civ 226. The s. 232B 
TULRCA rule that small, accidental failures ought to be regarded does not apply here. 
62 The precise sum to be fixed by statutory instrument. TU Act ss. 6 and 16 inserting a new s.32ZA, s. 256D and 
Schedule 4 into TULRCA  
63 BIS/15/418, 3. For evidence of strong continuities here with the rhetoric of the Thatcher Governments see S 
Fredman, ‘The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the Thatcher Years’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 24-44 
64 See eg Boris Johnson, Daily Telegraph, 4 October 2010; Katja Hall, deputy director-general of the CBI, Daily 
Telegraph 13 May 2015 
12 
 
these Tube strike militants wrecking your lives’.65 In Parliament, and in the policy documents 
published by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, the language was somewhat 
more measured, but the message essentially the same. The Government’s primary aim was to 
ensure that there was always ‘clear and ongoing’ support for industrial action.66 A second 
objective, in cases where industrial action was likely to impact on the provision of ‘important 
public services’, was to make it more difficult for workers to strike, without going so far as to 
prohibit them from doing so.67    
 
In explaining the amendments to the information and notice provisions, the Government 
again referred to its wish to ensure ‘fairness’, ‘democracy’ and, also, ‘transparency’.68 In 
Committee in the House of Commons, the aim behind the rule in section 5, requiring unions 
to provide voters with a summary of the matter(s) at issue, was defended on the basis that it 
would ensure that unions were ‘absolutely clear with members about what they were being 
asked to vote for’.69 The section 7 obligation to report industrial action to the Certification 
Officer would serve ‘transparency in the public interest’, it was explained.70 The increase of 
the required period of notice of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days was 
intended to allow the employer and trade union more time to resolve their dispute without the 
need for industrial action.71 The new ‘sunset’ rule in section 9, that the mandate won in a 
ballot automatically expires after 6 months, was directed at ensuring that there was ‘ongoing’ 
support for industrial action.72 
 
As justification for the rules introduced by the 2016 Act, the Government’s depiction of 
politically motivated union leaders organising industrial action against the wishes of a 
majority of the membership, and of industrial action in the public sector as routinely 
breaching the rights of consumers of ‘important public services’, may be objected to on a 
number of grounds. The first is the way in which it overlooks or obscures important elements 
                                                 
65 4 October, 2010. 
66 ‘We’ve seen … strike action that took place where perhaps only 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the members … 
actually voted for it, and that’s not right, it’s unfair’. Sajid Javid, Business Secretary, Financial Times 10 
January, 2015 
67 See eg Sajid Javid on BBC News 12 May 2015, cited Darlington and Dobson, 5: ‘by increasing the thresholds 
it will certainly increase the hurdles that need to be crossed’. ‘None of these changes are about banning strikes’  
BIS/15/418, 4. 
68 See eg Nick Boles, Minister for Skills and Equalities, in Committee in the House of Lords, 20 October 2015. 
69 Nick Boles, 20 October 2015, column 248 
70 Nick Boles, 20 October 2015, column 259 
71 Nick Boles, 20 October 2015, column 262 
72 Nick Boles, 20 October 2015, column 266. The Bill provided originally that the mandate would expire after 4 
rather than 6 months. 
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of the already highly restrictive legal framework governing trade union organisation and 
industrial action. For example, it seems not to take account of the rule prohibiting trade 
unions from disciplining members who refuse to participate in, or to support, industrial 
action, regardless of the level of support shown for the action in the pre-strike ballot.73 This 
of course places very significant limits on the kind of steps that union leaders may take in an 
effort to ‘force’ reluctant members to come out. Similarly, the Government’s representation 
of intra-union relations seems to disregard the existence of detailed provisions requiring that 
trade union leaders be elected by members by way of a postal vote.74 Finally, it obscures the 
fact that the (therefore democratically accountable) leaders are prohibited from using 
industrial action lawfully as a means of pursuing political objectives of their own (or anybody 
else’s), by reason of the golden formula.75 That the right to strike is an essential element of 
collective bargaining, that industrial action may often be organised as part of efforts to secure 
pay deals or defend pension rights, and that the pressure for it may come from the members 
and not the leadership, is barely admitted by the Government’s portrayal of supposedly 
common practice.  
 
A second related criticism of the Government’s justification of the amendments is its lack of 
a solid evidentiary basis. In support of the claim that the existing rules on pre-strike ballots 
were undemocratic because they allowed small numbers of yes voters to force or coerce a 
silent majority into taking part in industrial action against its better judgement, for example, 
the Government provided evidence of low turn-outs in some pre-strike ballots, but no 
evidence that abstainers in those ballots opposed industrial action, or were coerced into taking 
part.76 In debates in the House of Commons, Ministers often referred to specific examples of 
behaviour which they sought to present as typical or common, without providing evidence 
that those examples were in fact representative.77 As it consulted on the Bill, the Government 
produced an Impact Assessment on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services that was 
roundly criticised by the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) for its lack of evidence, limited 
scope, and failure to explain the rationale for the proposals in a ‘straightforward and logical’ 
                                                 
73 TULRCA ss 64, 65 
74 TULRCA ss 46-61 
75 TULRCA ss 219, 244 
76 eg Sajid Javid, Business Secretary, Financial Times 10 January, 2015; Nick Boles 20.10.2015 column 194 
77 eg Sajid Javid 14.9.2015 column 765; Nick Boles 20.10.2015 columns 194-5, columns 195-6 
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way.78 Neither the Government’s identification of the problem to be addressed nor its 
preferred solution were supported, in the RPC’s opinion, by sufficient evidence. A particular 
weakness of the Assessment, identified by the RPC, was its failure to discuss possible 
alternatives to the introduction of thresholds, including e-balloting.  
 
The Consultation on Ballot Thresholds itself did not contain any additional evidence to give 
credence to the Government’s proposals.79 It presented the introduction of new higher 
thresholds as a done deal, defining its purpose extremely narrowly as ‘to help define who 
within the fire, health, education, transport, border security and nuclear decommissioning 
sectors is subject to the 40% important public services threshold’.80 In line with that purpose, 
it invited comment only in respect of the ‘important public services’ threshold, and even here 
only in a remarkably circumscribed way. In the event, it did not uncover a wealth of support 
for the new threshold.81 In response, as we have seen, it deleted from the Bill the reference to 
those engaged in the provision of services ‘ancillary’ to important public services, thereby 
narrowing the scope of the threshold. But it did not make any changes to its definition of such 
services. The much more restrictive definition of ‘essential services’, adhered to for several 
decades now by the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association was dismissed by the 
Government as ‘non-binding’: merely, ‘guidelines … suggested by some of the ILO’s 
supervisory bodies [which] fulfil an informal advisory role’.82 
 
The rules contained within sections 5-9 of the Act – dealing with trade union obligations to 
provide notice and information in connection with ballots and ensuing industrial action – 
were not consulted upon at all by Government. From the record of committee debates in the 
House of Commons, we may conclude that, again, neither the identification of the problems 
to be addressed by these rules, nor the proposed solutions, were supported with sufficient 
evidence.83 In respect of section 5, for example, no evidence whatever was produced in 
                                                 
78 RPC15-BIS-2402. The RPC is an independent advisory non-departmental public body which aims to ensure 
that decisions are made on the basis of a robust, evidence-based policy making process: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-policy-committee  
79 BIS/15/415, 5-6 
80 BIS/15/415, 4 
81 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Government Response to Consultation on Tackling 
Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers (November 2015) [BIS/15/621], 7 
82 BIS/15/16, 10. The decisions of the CFA, like those of the CEACR, are of course better understood as a form 
of soft law and, as such, a part of international law. See further C La Hovary, ‘The ILO’s supervisory bodies’ 
‘soft law jurisprudence’’ in A Blackett and A Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook on Transnational Labour 
Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 
83 Public Bill Committee, 22 October 2015, columns 245-268 
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support of the Government’s claim that, as things stood, union members did not always 
understand the nature of the dispute giving rise to the ballot.84 Similarly, no evidence was 
provided to show that extending the notice period in section 234A TULRCA from 7 to 14 
days would likely result in more negotiated settlements of disputes.85 The claim that the 
sunset rule introduced by section 9 was necessary to ensure that industrial action was always 
‘based on a current mandate’, was also unsupported.86 
 
A third line of objection to the Government’s explanation of the desirability of the legislation 
lies with the lack of fit between the professed policy objective of ensuring ongoing and clear 
support for industrial action, and the chosen method of achieving that aim. As several 
commentators have pointed out, to require that a particular percentage of an electorate take 
part in an election – in addition to requiring a majority vote in favour – is to confer a special 
status on abstentions.87 Imagine a case where 100 individuals are entitled to vote, and the 
rules require a turn-out of at least 50%, and of those voting, a simple majority in favour. In 
scenario 1, 50 votes are cast, 49 for and 1 against, and the ballot is won. In scenario 2, 49 of 
the electorate again vote yes, but the no-voter chooses to abstain with the result that the 
threshold of 50% is not met and the ballot is lost. As is thus illustrated, the imposition of 
participation thresholds means that a small number of abstentions – potentially even a single 
one – may frustrate or trump a much higher number of yes votes. Active opponents of strike 
action will therefore do well to abstain rather than voting no – so that far from encouraging 
higher participation rates in pre-election ballots, as the Government apparently intended, the 
imposition of participation thresholds may provide a reason not to. It may also be noted here 
that the provision made in s. 4 of the Act for a review of secure methods of electronic 
balloting and the use of pilot schemes did not form part of the Bill as originally drafted. From 
the outset, trade unions and others argued that the aim of improving participation rates could 
be met more easily by permitting electronic balloting, for instance by email and/or text 
                                                 
84 Jo Stevens, 22 Oct 2015, column 247. Nick Boles produced a small number of ballot papers with what he 
described as ‘vague, short descriptions’ of the dispute – but no evidence that these descriptions had been 
regarded as insufficient by union members: 22 Oct 2015, column 249 
85 Nick Boles 22 Oct 2015, column 262 
86 Nick Boles 22 Oct 2015, columns 266-7 
87 Darlington and Dobson, 8-9 
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message.88 The agreement of Government to include section 4 came very late in the day, in 
part acceptance of an amendment tabled in the House of Lords.89 
 
 
   
 
Likely Impact of the New Rules? 
The likely impact of the new rules on the ability of trade unions and workers lawfully to 
organise and participate in industrial action may be assessed through consideration of (a) 
available evidence of ballot turnouts and results to date, and (b) judicial approaches to the 
interpretation of the legislation and the consideration of applications for injunctions.90 
Focusing on the new ballot thresholds, and applying these retrospectively to past ballots, 
Darlington and Dobson concluded that the impact of the new thresholds is likely to be 
significant.91 Of a sample of 158 strike ballots held by 28 trade unions between 1997 and 
2015, only around half met the 50% turnout threshold, and only 55 of 90 met the 40% 
support threshold. Importantly, very few of the large public sector unions which held one-day 
strikes in June and November 2011 met either threshold. Given the large numbers of workers 
involved in these public sector strikes, this meant that, had the new thresholds been in force, 
they would have prevented 3.3 million workers from exercising the right to strike. Analysing 
their findings further, Darlington and Dobson highlighted that it is national ballots, in 
particular, that will be difficult to win under the new rules: workplace, area and single 
employer ballots routinely attract higher turnouts.92 Unions with members who have close 
occupational identities will likely find it easier to meet the thresholds than more general 
unions.93 
 
In addition to making it more difficult to win ballots, the rules contained in sections 2-9 of the 
Act would also appear to provide fertile ground for future applications for injunctions.94 
                                                 
88 See eg Frances O’Grady, Independent, 21 March 2015; Mark Serwotka BBC News, 19 May 2015; both cited 
Darlington and Dobson, 12 
89 Nick Boles 27 April 2016. Some speculated that a set of amendments, including this one, was conceded by 
Government in return for trade union support for the campaign to remain in the EU. See eg Rowena Mason, 
‘Eurosceptics question motives for trade union bill climbdown’ The Guardian, 27 April, 2016 
90 The latter is discussed above in the section entitled Injunctions. 
91 Darlington and Dobson, chapter 6. 
92 Darlington and Dobson, chapter 7 
93 Ibid. 
94 Originally clauses 2-8 of the Bill.  
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Section 3, for example, presents unions with the practically difficult task of discerning 
whether a majority of those entitled to vote are ‘at the relevant time normally engaged in the 
provision of important public services’. At a minimum, this seems likely to require trade 
unions to keep up-to-date records of detailed job descriptions of their members – and, of 
course, to bear the potentially considerable cost of doing so.95 Even when in possession of the 
most up-to-date and detailed of records, however, a trade union may struggle to identify those 
who are ‘normally engaged’ in the provision of relevant services. Draft regulations published 
by the Government go some way to clarifying the scope of such services, but give little 
indication of how the matter of engagement in their provision ought to be judged.96 Is a 
hospital cleaner normally engaged in the provision of ‘accident and emergency services’, for 
example, if he works to keep the A&E department clean? Is the worker who sells snacks from 
a catering trolley on a train normally engaged in ‘passenger railway services’? In partial 
recognition of the difficulties involved, the Bill was amended to include a proviso: 'unless at 
that time the union reasonably believes this not to be the case’. How the courts will judge the 
question of ‘reasonable belief’ remains to be seen, but past experience would suggest that 
trade unions proceed here with caution.97 Similarly, the requirement in section 5 that unions 
include in the ballot paper a summary of the matter(s) at issue would appear to throw the door 
open wide to applications for injunctions on the grounds that the union has not provided 
sufficient, or the right kind of, detail.98 The obligation, contained in the same section, to 
specify types of industrial action short of a strike is potentially problematic because concepts 
like ‘overtime ban’ or ‘go-slow’ are not terms of art.99  
 
Taken together, the rules in section 5 bind the union to carry out a course of action devised at 
the time of the ballot, thereby preventing it from developing its strategy in line with changing 
circumstances and priorities.100 The extension in section 8 of the period of notice that must be 
given to an employer of the commencement of industrial action from 7 to 14 days provides an 
employer with additional time to hire replacement agency workers, as it may in the future be 
                                                 
95 BIS/16/15, paras 74, 81 
96 [Draft] Industrial Action (Important Public Services) Regulations 2016: BIS/16/15, Annex B 
97 See eg British Railways Board v NUR [1989] IRLR 348, P v NASUWT [2003] UKHL 8, and RMT v Serco 
[2011] EWCA Civ 226, for discussions of what is ‘reasonably practicable’ in various contexts and therefore 
required of the trade unions. 
98 As originally drafted, the Bill required a ‘reasonably detailed statement of the matter’ 
99 Jo Stevens MP, 22 Oct 2015, column 247-8 
100 TU Act, s 5 
18 
 
permitted to do.101 The sunset rule contained in section 9, meanwhile, might cause a union to 
have to repeat the whole lengthy and costly balloting process when the six month mandate 
comes to an end. Pointing at committee stage to the marked lack of evidence provided by the 
Government to show that these provisions would meet their stated policy objectives of 
greater transparency and accountability, Opposition politicians suggested that the true 
intention was to tie the unions up in ‘blue tape’ (as opposed to red tape) to the point where 
their rights and those of workers had become ‘illusory’.102 In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, this strikes us as persuasive. 
 
 
4.  Picketing and Protest 
In respect of picketing, the Trade Union Act introduces seven new conditions that must be 
met if picketing is to be deemed ‘lawful’ under section 220 TULRCA. Under the terms of a 
new section 220A, the union must (i) appoint a person to supervise the picket, who is (ii) 
either an official or a member of the union, and in either case familiar with the relevant 
provisions of the Code of Practice. The union must (iii) take reasonable steps to tell the 
police the picket supervisor’s name, where the picketing will be taking place, and how to 
contact the picket supervisor. And it must (iv) provide the ‘picket supervisor’ with a letter 
stating that the picketing is approved by the union. The picket supervisor must (v) on request, 
show that letter to the employer and/or to any individual acting on behalf of the employer. 
She must (vi) at all times be either present at the picket, or readily contactable by the union 
and the police, and able to attend at short notice. Whenever present, she must (vii) wear 
something (eg a badge or armband) that readily identifies her as the picket supervisor. Failure 
to comply with any one of these conditions will mean that the picketing in question is not 
deemed lawful by the Act, regardless of whether or not the failure has prejudiced the 
employer in any way.103 As a result, the statutory immunities from liability in tort will not 
apply; workers will lose their protection from unfair dismissal.104  
 
In respect of forms of protest organised in connection with an industrial dispute other than 
peaceful picketing, a second Consultation associated with the Bill (on Tackling Intimidation 
                                                 
101 Stephen Doughty 22 Oct 2015, column 261. See draft regulations annexed to the Consultation Paper, Hiring 
Agency Staff During Strike Action (July 2015) [BIS/15/416] 
102 eg Stephen Doughty, 22 Oct 2015, column 244, column 245, column 261 
103 s. 220A TULRCA, inserted by s, 10 TU Act 
104 s. 219 TULRCA as amended by s. 10 TU Act, s. 238A TULRCA 
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of Non-Striking Workers) contained several proposals including: new laws to require trade 
unions to publish a plan of intended action in advance of a protest, and to publish an annual 
report to the Certification Officer of picketing and associated protest activity; the creation of 
a new criminal offence of intimidation on the picketing line; and the reform and 
modernization of existing rules so as to ensure that they covered social media.105 In light of 
the responses received to that Consultation, which again offered very little by way of support 
for the proposals, the Government decided not to implement any of these within the Act, but 
instead only to amend the accompanying Code of Practice on Picketing.106 In particular, it 
intends to amend the Code so as:  
 to clarify the range of legal protections which already exist to protect striking and 
non-striking workers, whether union members or not  
 to set out clearly the existing legal protections against the misuse of social media and 
to provide guidance for those people who wish to seek redress where they have 
suffered online intimidation as a result of industrial disputes  
 to set out additional advice regarding the ‘transparency’ of trade unions 
 to clarify the rights and responsibilities of all those involved in or impacted upon by 
protests linked to industrial disputes.107 
 
 
Protecting non-striking workers from intimidation? 
Since the publication of its Manifesto in 2015, the Government has justified the changes to 
the law on picketing consistently with reference to the need to ‘protect non-striking workers 
from intimidation’,108 stating that ‘[w]hile this Government recognises that picketing is a 
lawful activity, we are equally clear that it should never be used as an opportunity to 
intimidate others’.109 In the Consultation, it explained that the primary means chosen to 
achieve this aim would involve giving legal force to existing parts of the Code of Practice – 
those that were ‘consistent with well organised industrial action’.110 ‘As most unions already 
observe the guidelines of the Code, these new requirements should have little impact on 
responsible picketing but will encourage more responsible behaviour from those unions 
                                                 
105 BIS/15/415, Summary of Consultation 
106 BIS/15/621, Foreword 
107 BIS/15/621, esp. paras 24-5, 58, 62-3 
108 Manifesto; BIS/15/415 
109 BIS/15/621, Foreword 
110 BIS/15/415, para 19 
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whose picketing activities ignore the guidelines with the intent to intimidate for the 
furtherance of industrial disputes.’111  
 
In respect of protests associated with picketing, the potential victims of intimidation and other 
forms of ‘unacceptable’ behaviour were identified more widely by the Consultation than they 
had been in the Manifesto to include representatives of management, and members of the 
public, as well as non-striking workers.112 One key problem to be addressed, it was said in the 
Consultation, was the development in recent years of forms of leverage protest which were 
not caught by the terms of the TULRCA and other legislation.113 Action was needed to 
prevent ‘unacceptable conduct’ in the future and, where it could not be prevented, to allow 
for the enforcement of strong remedies.114 In its own Response to the Consultation, the 
Government emphasised, in particular, its concern about ‘intimidation online’ and in social 
media.115 Recognising now, however, that there were in fact ‘no significant gaps in the legal 
framework’, it suggested instead that there was a need to, ‘raise awareness of existing 
protections and ensure that they are used to maximum effect’.116 
 
As justification for the changes to the rules on picketing contained in the 2016 Act, and the 
proposed amendments to the Code of Practice, the principal criticism that can be made of the 
Government’s statements lies, again, with their lack of a solid evidentiary basis. Certain of 
the claims made in the Consultation – for example that the rules in section 220A will have 
‘little impact on responsible picketing’ because the relevant parts of the Code are already 
respected by most unions – were supported by no empirical evidence whatever.117 Elsewhere, 
there was frequent and lengthy reference to the ‘evidence’ submitted to the Carr Review. This 
was a Review commissioned by the Government in 2013 from the barrister Bruce Carr QC 
into the alleged use of extreme tactics in industrial action, including leverage tactics.118 As 
Mr Carr took pains to emphasise, however, the ‘evidence’ that the Review collated was, in 
truth, little more than a set of allegations.119 Specifically, it was ‘substantially unchallenged 
and untested either by contrary evidence being submitted by those on the other side of the 
                                                 
111 BIS/15/415, para 18 
112 BIS/15/415, BIS/15/621 
113 BIS/15/415, paras 5-6 
114 BIS/15/415, para 7 
115 BIS/15/621, para 25 
116 BIS/15/621, para 31, our emphasis 
117 BIS/15/415, para 18 
118 The review was led by Bruce Carr QC, who reported in 2014 
119 Bruce Carr QC, The Carr Report (October 2014), 1.11 
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industrial fence or by any form of inquisitorial process at oral hearings’. And it was ‘largely 
one-sided’, coming ‘overwhelmingly from employers or those acting on behalf of them’. For 
these reasons, Mr Carr chose not to seek to make findings of fact in his Report.120 In its 
Consultation, in contrast, the Government was not particularly careful to distinguish between 
allegations and matters of fact. It acknowledged in a single footnote that ‘all events 
mentioned [in the Report] remain alleged’,121 but elsewhere made statements of purported 
fact that were supported only by reference to some or all of those same events.122 In addition, 
it referred to ‘evidence’ supplied to Carr by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
of reports of intimidatory tactics that had been used during industrial disputes,123 without 
mentioning the fact that the ACPO had described the current legal framework as generally 
effective.124 The ACPO had not asked for an extension of its powers, but rather only better 
guidance for the police.  
 
In common with the Consultation on Balloting Thresholds, this second Consultation was 
notable for the way in which it presented itself as an evidence-gathering exercise, seeking to 
find support for decisions already made. First and foremost, it sought, it said, to collect 
evidence of intimidatory behaviour experienced during picketing and protests linked to 
industrial disputes. It also sought evidence on whether further provisions of the Code of 
Practice ought to be made legally binding, in addition to those already identified. As the 
Government later went some way to admitting, the Consultation in the event revealed little in 
the way of evidence of intimidation and little by way of support for its legislative proposals. 
Only 177 responses were received. Of those, a clear majority indicated that they had neither 
experienced nor observed incidents of intimidatory behaviour during industrial disputes.125 In 
partial contradiction, perhaps, of the Government’s claim that the use of social media was a 
‘clear and prominent concern throughout most of the responses’, only 16 responses cited use 
of social media as an example of intimidatory behaviour.126 Only very small minorities wrote 
in favour of the proposals to create a new criminal offence, to require trade unions to publish 
                                                 
120 Carr Report, 1.11 
121 BIS/15/415, para 4, fn 1 
122 Eg ‘in recent years a range of problems have arisen despite [the existing] framework. While most unions 
adhere to the guidelines of the Code, there have been a number of high-profile allegations of the rules on 
picketing being flouted, or proving difficult to enforce.’ 
123 BIS/15/415, 4-5 
124 Carr Report, 92-4 
125 BIS/15/621, para 12 
126 BIS/15/621, para 19 
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plans of protests, and to report annually to the Certification Officer regarding picketing and 
protest activity.127 
 
As with the introduction of the balloting thresholds, it may also be doubted whether the new 
rules on picketing supervisors are the best means of achieving the policy aims described by 
the Government. As Ford and Novitz have emphasised, criminal law already provides 
protection against intimidation on the picket line.128 Moreover, the kinds of ‘intimidatory’ 
behaviour listed in the Consultation would already fall outside the definition of ‘lawful 
picketing’ in section 220 TULRCA, and might also constitute torts such as public 
nuisance.129 The question arises then why, if the aim is to prevent intimidatory behaviour, 
conditions should be imposed upon those who are picketing peacefully, as s 220 already 
requires? Why should the consequence of failure to meet those conditions (even for those 
who are picketing peacefully) be forfeiture of the protection of the statutory immunities and, 
for individual workers, protection from unfair dismissal? The Government’s claim to 
recognise that ‘picketing is a lawful activity’,130 is difficult indeed to reconcile with the steps 
it has taken so dramatically to narrow the circumscription of the forms of picketing that are 
deemed ‘lawful’ by the Act.  
  
 
What is left of the right to picket? 
Notwithstanding the Government’s assertion that section 10 enacts a set of rules that are 
anyway adhered to by ‘most unions’, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which one or two 
of the new requirements may be practically very difficult to comply with.131 Where an 
industrial dispute involves many workers employed at a large number of workplaces, an 
equally large number of ‘picket supervisors’ may have to be appointed by the union if it is to 
satisfy the terms of the Act. Where this number exceeds the number of trade union officials 
available, as well it might, the union will have to rely on volunteer members – if such can be 
found. Volunteers will have to be trained (‘familiar with any provisions of [the] Code of 
Practice’). They will have to be available throughout, either present at the picket, or readily 
                                                 
127 BIS/15/621, para 29, 44, 51 
128 Ford and Novitz 544 
129 Ford and Novitz 544 
130 See eg BIS/15/621, Foreword 
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contactable by the union and the police, and able to attend at short notice.132 And they will 
have to be willing to draw attention to themselves as ‘active’ union members, by having their 
name reported to the police, and by making themselves easily identifiable. For these reasons, 
members may well be reluctant to step forward. 
 
What is the likely impact of the rules, then, on trade union practices? In his research into the 
frequency, nature and context of the use of injunctions in industrial disputes, Gregor Gall has 
noted the very low incidence of applications for injunctions which apply to picketing.133 He 
explains this with reference to the already highly restrictive legal framework, and the 
consequent steep decline in attempts by unions to use picketing ‘effectively’ ie to prevent the 
movement of workers and goods into and out of a workplace. In other words, so ineffective 
are most pickets, that employers have little to gain by preventing them by means of an 
injunction from continuing. If Gall is right – and as we have seen, the Government produced 
scant evidence to suggest otherwise – then the new, even more restrictive rules seem unlikely 
to result in a sharp increase in applications for injunctions to prevent picketing, even if, on 
paper, they appear to create several opportunities for litigation as to the precise nature of the 
obligations imposed.134 A more plausible scenario, perhaps, is that finding it increasingly 
difficult to picket lawfully, unions may make greater use of precisely the types of leverage 
action which the Government claimed in its Consultation to wish to put a stop to.135 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
                                                 
132 Trade Union Act 2016, s. 10 introducing new s. 220A TULRCA. A requirement originally contained in the 
Bill that the union provide the picket supervisor with a letter authorising her to act as such, and that she show 
that letter to ‘any person who reasonable asks to see it’ was amended following the receipt by Government of 
responses to the Consultation which pointed out the potential breach of Data Protection law: BIS/15/621, paras 
37-9 
133 According to Gall’s figures, in the period 1995-2005, only 7 such applications were made, out of a total 82 
applications for injunctions in industrial disputes in the same period: Gall 2006. In 2005-2014, Gall uncovered 
only 5 applications for injunctions made in connection with picketing: G Gall, ‘Injunctions as a Legal Weapon 
in Collective Industrial Disputes in Britain, 2005-2014’ (2016) British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
forthcoming   
134 It should be noted here that the new requirements have not been accompanied by an invitation to the courts to 
disregard ‘small accidental failure’, as in the case of s. 232B TULRCA. For a recent example of a case 
involving an application for an injunction to prevent picketing see: Thames Cleaning and Support Services Ltd v 
United Voices of the World [2016] EWHC 1310 (QB) 
135 Ford and Novitz 545; L McCluskey, ‘Can Unions Stay Within the Law Any Longer?’ (2015) 44 ILJ 439; B 
Carr, ‘Will the Trade Union Bill help or hinder industrial relations?’ 12th February, 2016: 
http://www.devereuxchambers.co.uk/assets/docs/news/trade_union_bill_bc_1222016.pdf 
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Introducing the Trade Union Bill at its second reading, the Secretary of State stated the 
following: 
[T]his Bill is not a declaration of war on the trade union movement. It is not an 
attempt to ban industrial action. It is not an attack on the rights of working people… It 
is simply the latest stage in the long journey of modernisation and reform. It will put 
power in the hands of the mass membership; bring much-needed sunlight to dark 
corners of the movement; and protect the rights of everyone in this country—those 
who are union members and those who are not, and those hard-working men and 
women who are hit hardest by industrial action.136 
 
Notwithstanding the protestations of the Minister, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that 
one, at least, of the Government’s main aims with this legislation was to make it harder for 
trade unions to organise industrial action, and thereby to weaken their ability to protest or 
resist measures taken by employers, especially in the public sector. Indeed, with respect to 
industrial action in ‘important public services’, this was quite explicitly the objective.137   
The narrative provided by Government was of trade unions dominated by militant, bullying 
leaders acting in disregard of the wishes of the membership and, even more so, the general 
public. Trade unions needed to be reined in, held to account, have greater light shone upon 
their shady dealings. While this account may have possessed a measure of internal logic (if 
unions were in fact dominated by militant, bullying leaders then it would indeed be important 
to introduce stronger elements of democratic control), it was almost wholly unsupported by 
evidence.138 Nor were the measures contained within the Act, and the Bill as originally 
drafted, always shown to constitute the most effective means of addressing the ‘problems’ 
identified by Government, had such problems existed.  
 
Research suggests that, as a result of the introduction of the new measures, it will become 
markedly more difficult for unions to secure the required threshold levels of support in per-
strike ballots, especially national (predominantly public sector) ballots, and those organised 
by large ‘generalist’ trade unions. In some circumstances, it will be near impossible to 
organise pickets so that they fall within the now astoundingly narrow definition of what is 
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lawful in that context. Perhaps the most significant feature of the Act is the number of 
opportunities it appears likely to create for employers to raise actions for interim relief. In 
light of the narrative offered by Government in support of the Act, and especially its highly 
reductive definition of the public interest as essentially coincident with the interests of 
consumers and businesses, we fear that it might propel members of the judiciary further down 
the slippery slope identified above: granting interim injunctions to prevent industrial action 
that is judged more likely than not to be found at trial to be protected action taken in relation 
to a valid industrial dispute, but likely nonetheless to damage the public interest.    
We conclude this analysis of the Trade Union Act 2016 by noting that if the same turnout and 
support requirements contained in sections 2-3 of the Act had been applied to the United 
Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 23 June 2016, the 51.89 per cent of 
votes in favour of leaving the EU, coupled with a 72.2 per cent turnout, would have resulted 
in the United Kingdom remaining a full member of the European project. 139  
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